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Life Sciences and Intellectual Property: 
Technology Law Put to the Test
Life sciences have developed into one of the leading areas of technology. Being highly inno-
vative and needing huge capital investments, the life sciences industry is heavily dependent 
on intellectual property rights. However, the function of intellectual property law has to be 
seen in connection with other areas of law like regulatory and liability law. The life sciences 
are a typical area of modern technology, challenging the law not only to foster innovation 
and facilitate technology transfer but also to insure safety and allocate risks. Interestingly, 
the traditional distribution of legal functions has become blurred in the area of life sciences: 
Regulatory law provides an incentive for developmental activities like clinical tests while 
patent law is increasingly used to discourage unwanted activities.
I. Introduction
Life sciences have given rise to some of the most important and innovative sec-
tors of industry. Medicine, pharmaceutics and agriculture1 show not only high 
innovation rates but also demand huge investments. Intellectual property (IP) 
law therefore plays a major role in these sectors. However, intellectual property 
law has to be seen in perspective with other areas of law as for instance regula-
tory and liability law. Being highly innovative, the life sciences sector promises 
not only huge potential benefits to society but also entails inherent risks. Life 
sciences challenge the law not only to ensure innovations and distribute their 
potential benefits but also to cope with these risks. Traditionally, IP law fosters 
innovation and facilitates technology transfer whereas regulatory law limits the 
risks of a specific technology and liability law allocates the remaining risks. How-
ever, this traditional distribution of functions has become blurred especially in 
the life sciences sector.
The following analysis tries to show how IP can be seen as a part of technol-
ogy law and how life sciences are one of the major areas where legal intervention 
meets new challenges. First, the life sciences area will be described as one of the 
leading areas of technology. Second, technology law will be defined by its func-
tions. Third, IP law will be shown as an important part of technology law. Fourth, 
1 The agricultural sector comprises seeds and crop protection.
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current challenges for IP law and technology law as a whole originating from the 
life sciences and their rapid progress will be illustrated.
II. Life Sciences
1. Using and Treating Living Organisms
From a practical perspective life sciences can be defined as the science behind 
medicine, pharmacy and agriculture or their corresponding industries. However, 
they play a certain role in even more industries like the chemical industry (espe-
cially as “grey” biotechnology). On a more theoretical level, life sciences can be 
defined as the use of living organisms (organisms as tools: biotechnology) and 
the protection of living organisms (organisms as “patients”: medicine, veterinary 
medicine and plant protection). The term “sciences” is somehow misleading: 
Although science is the mere pursuit of knowledge, life sciences are especially 
about the use of specific knowledge, they are technology.
The success of the term “life sciences” can be explained by the fact that many 
formerly single disciplines like chemistry, biochemistry, physiology, genetics 
etc. cannot be separated clearly anymore. Moreover, scientific research in the 
life sciences-area cannot be done without biotechnological tools. Even the line 
between pure science and its technological application is no longer clear in the 
life sciences area. Therefore, the use of the term “Life Sciences” is not only prac-
tical but also justified.
2. Life Sciences as a Leading Technology
Together with information technology and nanotechnology (material science) 
life sciences represent one of the technological areas with the highest innova-
tion rate. Unlike some areas of information technology (e. g. software program-
ming) in which innovative efforts can be distributed among a large heterarchical 
network of contributors (open source software),2 innovations in the life sciences 
sector typically require substantial investments. This underlines the importance 
of a viable life sciences industry.
2 Metzger, Vom Einzelurheber zu Teams und Netzwerken: Erosion des Schöpferprinzips?, in: 
Leible/Ohly/Zech (eds.), Wissen – Märkte – Geistiges Eigentum, 2010, 79 seqq.
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Life Sciences and Intellectual Property: Technology Law Put to the Test 3
III. Technology Law: Fostering and Harnessing Innovations
Since the life sciences industry is heavily dependent on capital intensive inno-
vations, it is not surprising that IP law, especially patent law, plays a major role 
for this industry. This is not only true for the pharmaceutical sector but also for 
medicinal products, plant protection and increasingly for seeds where the tradi-
tional plant breeders’ rights do not suit state-of-the-art trait development. How-
ever, the function of IP protection has to be seen in connection with the functions 
of other areas of law as for instance regulatory law and liability law. All of these 
functions constitute the legal framework for a specific technology.
1. Technology Law Steers Technology and is Driven by Technology
Technology law can be defined as the law (i. e. all legal rules) regulating (in a 
broader sense) technology. Therefore, technology law encompasses all legal rules 
influencing the creation of technology (innovation), its distribution (diffusion), 
its application (use) or the consequences of its use (opportunities and risks). 
Although there is some discussion about the term technology itself, nowadays 
technology can reasonably be understood as the application of science based 
knowledge.3 Life sciences with their application in science and industry therefore 
can be understood as an area of technology.
Technology is highly dynamic, which is one of its most important aspects4 and 
especially true for life sciences. Constantly evolving technologies form the basis 
of Schumpeter’s famous business cycles. Areas of technology can be divided into 
separate technologies, i. e. individual methods using a specific application of cer-
tain scientific knowledge to solve a specific problem. This closely resembles pat-
ent law’s fundamental definition of an invention. Innovations, i. e. the creation 
of new technologies from ideas to applicable inventions and further on to mar-
ketable services and products, can be understood as the smallest single entity of 
whole areas of technology like gene technology or nanotechnology. The function 
of legal rules in technology law can be explained as a legal intervention at some 
point of the innovation cycle.
Technology’s dynamic also drives legal innovations. The introduction of a 
new technology sometimes calls for new legal rules. The examples are manifold 
3 Technology can be defined as the application of scientific knowledge for practical purposes, 
especially in industry, cf. Oxford English Dictionary (OED), Oxford University Press 2014, 
http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/198469?redirectedFrom=technology#eid, visited on the 30th 
of September 2014; Bunge, Technology as applied science, Technology and Culture 7 (1966), 
329. Historically, the link between science and technology has not been established before the 
19th century.
4 Murswiek, Festschrift Kriele, 1997, 651, 652; Schulze-Fielitz, in: Schulte/Schröder (eds.), Hand-
buch des Technikrechts, 2. ed. 2011, 455, 463 seq.
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like combustion engine driven cars, nuclear technology or gene technology. The 
mutual influence of law and technology can be described as a “coevolution”.5
2. Four Major Functions of Technology Law
Technology law fulfils four major functions, which can be illustrated referring to 
the innovation cycle: New technologies are constantly developed, diffused and 
applied. Accordingly, the law influences the creation, diffusion and application 
of new technologies. At each of these stages it strives to enhance public welfare. 
The resulting four major functions are fostering innovation, enabling technology 
transfer, controlling inherent risks of technology use and assigning responsibili-
ties for resulting damages.
The first two functions (“columns”) of technology law concern the creation 
and diffusion of innovations. These two functions may be addressed as “enabling” 
technology.6 However, the law may also restrict technology; it is not only about 
creating and diffusing new technologies but also about using them safely and 
bearing the consequences of their use.7
2.1 Fostering Innovation: IP Law
First, the law can intervene with the creation of new technologies, especially pro-
vide incentives for new innovations where market failures hinder the innovation 
process. This is the classical role of IP law and will be described in more detail 
under IV.1. One of its main characteristics is that it is not specific to a certain 
technology but open to any technology therefore incentivising even the develop-
ment of unexpected technologies.
2.2 Enabling Technology Transfer: IP, Contract and Competition Law
Second, the law plays a role in technology transfer either forcing parties to trans-
fer technologies or, more important, creating a legal framework for the contrac-
tual exchange of new technologies. This is also a domain of IP law which creates 
markets for technology where the information paradox would otherwise hinder 
the exchange of information goods.8 IP law is complemented by contract law 
5 Eckardt, Technischer Wandel und Rechtsevolution, 2001, 7 seqq.
6 For the technology enabling and technology restricting functions of law see Vieweg, JuS 1993, 
894, 895; idem, Festgabe Lukes, 2000, 199, 202; Schulze-Fielitz, in: Schulte/Schröder Schröder 
(eds.), Handbuch des Technikrechts, 2. ed. 2011, 455, 463.
7 To a certain extent even regulatory law may act as a technology enabler since it provides legal 
certainty about the legality, the due diligence and the liability risk of using a specific technology, 
cf. Kloepfer, NuR 1997, 417, 417 seq.
8 Arrow, Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources for Invention, The Rand Corpora-
tion, 1962, 609, 615; Burstein, Exchanging Information Without Intellectual Property, Texas 
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Life Sciences and Intellectual Property: Technology Law Put to the Test 5
creating the legal framework for the material transfer of IP, for licenses or even 
for know-how contracts which do not rely on IP protection but only on the pro-
tection of trade secrets. A third important component of legal rules concerning 
technology transfer is competition law. By acting against restraints on competi-
tion it keeps technology markets open.9
2.3 Controlling Inherent Risks: Regulatory Law
Third, technology law encompasses regulatory law, intervening where a regu-
latory framework is needed to guarantee that a certain technology or area of 
technology is only used with an acceptable level of risk. Classical examples are 
legislations concerning steam power, automobiles, nuclear energy or gene tech-
nology. Since these legislations try to hedge a specific risk, they necessarily look 
backwards and can only regulate specific areas of technology.
Regulatory technology law primarily aims at the safety and security of using 
technologies. However, especially in the life sciences area it may also define 
legally binding boundaries of technology use which are ethically motivated. This 
can be due to the involvement of human beings (e. g. when using embryonic stem 
cells) or nonhuman beings (e. g. with animal testing).
2.4 Assigning Responsibilities: Liability Law
The fourth area of technology law is liability law allocating the remaining legally 
accepted risks and creating incentives for an optimal risk acceptance. This “col-
umn” is closely associated with the third (i. e. regulatory law) which defines the 
necessary diligence when using a certain technology and in some cases provides 
for strict liability rules.10 Therefore, general liability rules have to be taken into 
account together with more specific ones like product liability or liability rules for 
Law Review 91 (2012), 228, 229; Lemley, The Myth of the Sole Inventor, Michigan State Law 
Review, 110 (2012), 710, 748 seq.; Thambisetty, Patents as Credence Goods, Oxford Journal of 
Legal Studies 27 (2007), 707, 707 seq. See under IV.2.
 9 However, in order not to pose an undue burden on technology transfer European competition 
law provides for specific block exemptions, especially the technology transfer block exemp-
tion and the research and development block exemption, Commission Regulation (EU) No 
316/2014 of 21 March 2014 on the application of Article 101(3) of the Treaty on the Functioning 
of the European Union to categories of technology transfer agreements and Commission Regu-
lation (EU) No 1217/2010 on the application of Article 101(3) of the Treaty on the Functioning 
of the European Union to certain categories of research and development agreements; Turner, 
Intellectual Property and EU Competition Law, 2010, 131 seqq.
10 There is no general clause for a strict liability in Germany. On a European level, the product liabil-
ity directive provides for a liability regime which requires product defects instead of negligence 
but still does not comprise development risks (which were unforeseeable at the time of sale), art. 
7 (e) 85/374/EEC: “The producer shall not be liable as a result of this Directive if he proves: […]
(e) that the state of scientific and technical knowledge at the time when he put the product into 
circulation was not such as to enable the existence of the defect to be discovered […].”
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certain areas of technology. Liability rules generally can be categorized accord-
ing to the level of negligence they require. One of the main questions concerning 
strict liability rules is whether a certain rule allocates risks that were unforesee-
able according to the state of science and technology at the time of the causal act 
(development risks) to the infringer, the technology user or the damaged party.11
3. Life Sciences Law as the Law of Life Sciences Innovations
All four functions of influencing technological innovation and its application can 
be found in life sciences law. It is not only a kind of “practice group” but a dog-
matically consistent area of law concerning the use of living organisms as tools 
(biotechnology) and their treatment as “patients” (medicine, veterinary medicine 
and plant protection). Being part of technology law, life sciences law strives to 
foster innovation, enable technology transfer, control inherent risks and assign 
responsibilities.12
4. Research Interest: Interaction of Different Functions, Parallel between 
Loss and Benefit Allocation (Opportunities and Risks)
Looking at the different areas of technology law from the perspective of inno-
vation has the advantage of highlighting the connection between these areas 
which traditionally are regarded as separate legal disciplines. Moreover, it allows 
to draw parallels, for instance, to analyse IP law from a liability lawyer’s point 
of view. When technology law is about creating, distributing, using and bearing 
the consequences of innovations, the interaction between IP law, contract law, 
competition law, regulatory law and liability law becomes automatically the focus 
of juridical interest.
One of these interfaces deserving a closer look is between IP law, especially 
patent law, and liability law.13 Whereas patent law allocates the potential benefits 
(opportunities) of a new and inventive technology to the inventor or a licensee 
for a limited amount of time, liability law allocates the risks of its legitimate use – 
but (as long as there is no general clause for a strict liability) only where special 
strict liability rules exist. Therefore, arguably the allocation of opportunities and 
risks inherent to new technologies is asymmetric. This is in contrast to a funda-
mental rule of justice saying that one who enjoys the fruits of a certain activity 
shall also be the bearer of its risks. A strict liability rule which is not restricted to 
a certain technology or activity fulfils this criterion to a larger extent (although 
it might make legal decisions less predictable).
11 Schrupkowski, Die Haftung für Entwicklungsrisiken in Wissenschaft und Technik, 1995, 4 seqq.; 
Zech, JZ 2013, 21, 22 seq.
12 Zech, Basler Juristische Mitteilungen 2014, 1, 6 seq.
13 Zech, JZ 2013, 21, 26 seqq.
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Life Sciences and Intellectual Property: Technology Law Put to the Test 7
IV. The Role of IP Law: Fostering Innovation and Enabling 
Technology Transfer, Technology Neutrality
IP law dominates the first, and, to a certain extent, the second “column” of tech-
nology law. IP protection, especially patents, spurs innovation (first column) 
and promotes the disclosure of secret inventions (second column). Nowadays, 
there are many more theories about the function of IP law and especially pat-
ent law. They all fit into the two main aspects of technology law, i. e. promoting 
the creation and the distribution of innovations. One important feature of these 
legal rules is that they are not specific to a certain technology. This is in contrast 
to regulatory and (most of) liability law and a necessary consequence of patent 
law’s ex ante perspective. Other than regulatory law and most of liability law, pat-
ent law concerns future technology whose benefits and risks are yet unknown 
(and necessarily so).
1. Incentives for Innovation: Inventing and Developing
Traditionally, the most important function of patent law is to enable innova-
tions where markets without legal rules would fail.14 Inventions are public goods 
which can be used by an unlimited number of persons at the same time, and 
whose use, once the invention is disclosed, cannot be prohibited by factual means 
(non-exclusivity). Legal exclusivity enables amortisation of research and devel-
opment costs (subject to market success) and therefore encourages the creation 
of inventions.
However, this classical function of patents has been revised and extended. For 
instance, the role of patents as an indicator for potential investors (especially 
when patents are held by start-up companies) is now widely accepted.15 Patents 
therefore ensure the funding for highly innovative companies. This also increases 
the average total number of inventions made during a specific period of time.
Another aspect of enabling innovations which is located at a later stage of the 
innovation cycle (“downstream”) is the commercialization function.16 Patents 
not only spur the creation of new inventions but also the further development of 
such inventions towards a marketable service or product. Especially in the area 
14 Hettinger, Philosophy & Public Affairs 18 (1989), 31, 47 seqq.; Landes/Posner, The Economic 
Structure of Intellectual Property Law, 13; Ohly, in: Ohly/Klippel (eds.), Geistiges Eigentum 
und Gemeinfreiheit, 2007, 1, 3; Bechtold, GRUR Int 2008, 484, 485; Kerber, ZGE/IJP 5 (2013), 
245, 248 seqq.; for life sciences innovations see Haedicke, in: Depenheuer/Peifer (eds.), Geis-
tiges Eigentum: Schutzrecht oder Ausbeutungstitel?, 2008, 111, 112; Moufang, l.c., 89, 89 seqq., 
109; Uhrich, Stoffschutz, 2010, 101 seq., 111 seqq.
15 Cotter, Patent Holdup, Patent Remedies, and Antitrust Responses, The Journal of Corporation 
Law 34 (2009), 1151, 1154 seqq.; Graham/Merges/Samuelson/Sichelman, Berkeley Tech. L. J. 
24 (2009), 1255, 1297 seqq., 1303 seqq.
16 Webster/Jensen, Macroeconomic Conditions and Successful Commercialization, 2009, 4 seqq.
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of life sciences it is one of the current matters of dispute at which stage of the 
innovation cycle patent protection should interfere in order to get the optimum 
overall efficiency.17 Patents on ideas are not admissible in order to prevent block-
ing effects for further inventions (especially in new areas of technology). Even 
further, it is debated whether optimum protection should be pushed to the devel-
opmental stage after the basic invention has been made. This is also important to 
understand some recent developments which are described under V.
2. Enabling (and Encouraging) Technology Transfer
Patent law and other IP rights also enable and encourage the distribution of 
inventions. Especially patents are designed as an incentive for the disclosure of 
secret inventions.18 This is considered the second important traditional func-
tion of patents. Moreover, patents and IP rights in general are nowadays seen 
as an instrument to make information goods tradable.19 By creating a market 
for inventions, creative works etc. IP rights enable the allocation of such goods 
via market forces allowing them to be used by the most efficient users instead of 
being kept secret.
3. Technology-Specific and Technology-Unspecific Rules
While regulatory law and, to a certain extent, liability law are specific to a cer-
tain technology, IP law (especially patent law) is not (article 27 (1) TRIPS).20 The 
reason for this is that IP law has a proactive perspective, trying to enable inno-
vations that are yet to be made and whose usefulness has yet to be tested. Being 
open about the area of technology or the possible effect of the technology ena-
bles the creation of yet unknown technologies. Promoting a specific technology 
would discourage innovation in other areas whose benefit potentially will only 
become clear later. Therefore, it cannot be the task of IP law to reward a specific 
technology.
17 The life sciences area shows a huge amount of sequential innovations where patent protection 
for basic innovations may block follow on innovations, cf. Scotchmer, Standing on the Shoulders 
of Giants: Cumulative Research and Patent Law, Journal of Economic Perspectives 5 (1991), 29; 
Haedicke, in: Depenheuer/Peifer (eds.), Geistiges Eigentum: Schutzrecht oder Ausbeutungsti-
tel?, 2008, 111 (114 seq.); Moufang, in: Depenheuer/Peifer (eds.), o.c., 89 (108); Zech, in: Hilty/
Jaeger/Lamping (eds.), Herausforderung Innovation, 2012, 81, 87 seqq.; Krusemarck, Die 
abhängige Schöpfung im Recht des geistigen Eigentums, 2013, 125 seqq. (132).
18 Machlup, An Economic Review of the Patent System, 1958, 1; Beier, GRUR Int 1970, 1, 4 seq.
19 Arora/Fosfuri /Gambardella, Markets for Technology, 2001, 143 seqq.; Merges, Berkeley Tech. 
L. J. 20 (2005), 1477, 1489 seqq.; Uhrich, 114.; Godt, Eigentum an Information, 2007, 449 seqq., 
554 seqq.
20 See for restrictions in legal practice Burk/Lemley, Is Patent Law Technology Specific?, Berkeley 
Tech. L. J. 17 (2002), 1157 seqq.
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Life Sciences and Intellectual Property: Technology Law Put to the Test 9
V. Challenges in the Life Sciences Area
Especially in the life sciences area the traditional roles of IP rights and regulatory 
rules are respectively blurred. Regulatory law (more precisely data and market 
exclusivity) serves as an incentive for developmental activities whereas patent 
law is used (or is proposed to be used) as an instrument to hinder “unwanted” 
technologies and to promote “wanted” technologies.
1. Regulatory Law as the New IP?
Especially in the life sciences area the use of specific technologies or the dis-
tribution of specific products like gene technology products, pharmaceutical 
products, medicinal products or seeds is often tightly regulated by legal provi-
sions. Although the main function of such provisions is to control the risks of 
potentially dangerous technologies, they have assumed a secondary function of 
preventing potential market failures in the development and the production of 
such technological products.
1.1 Drugs for Rare Diseases
One major example in the pharmaceutical sector is market exclusivity for 
orphan drugs.21 In the European Union pharmaceuticals which are recognised 
as a treatment for rare diseases (i. e. diseases with an occurrence rate of less than 
5/10,00022) are given a ten years’ market exclusivity.23 Although the aim of this 
provision is clearly to incentivise the development of new orphan drugs by grant-
ing market exclusivity, this goal is not achieved by creating a new IP. Instead, 
only the marketing of the product is regulated. Seeming wrongly placed at first 
glance, the chosen legal tool is appropriate at a second glance. Whereas patent 
law seeks to foster technological creativity in an undirected manner, the orphan 
drug regulation creates a directed incentive seeking to enhance the development 
(e. g. by conducting clinical trials) of a specific type of product (orphan drugs).
1.2 Data and Marketing Protection for Pharmaceuticals
Likewise, the eight years’ data protection and ten years’ marketing protection 
(which may be extended by one additional year for a significant new indication) 
provided by Directive 2001/83/EC (as amended by Directive 2004/27/EC) and 
Regulation (EC) No 726/2004 act as an incentive for clinical trials which are nec-
21 Regulation (EC) No 141/2000 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 
1999 on orphan medicinal products.
22 Art. 3 (1) Regulation (EC) No 141/2000.
23 Art. 8 (1) Regulation (EC) No 141/2000.
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essary to obtain marketing authorisation.24 Such trials can be seen as late-stage 
developmental activities.25 The economic significance of such developmental 
activities is increased by the advent of biopharmaceuticals (biologics) which do 
not only cause higher early-stage research and development costs (development 
of the substance) but may also lead to higher costs for clinical trials due to their 
complexity and allergenic potential.26 Unlike orphan drug exclusivity,27 the mar-
keting protection provided by Directive 2001/83/EC is no real market exclusivity 
per se. Generic manufacturers are free to conduct clinical tests on their own and 
rely on the obtained results for their own application. This is also facilitated by 
patent law which provides a special exemption for clinical testing.28 However, due 
to the increased requirements for clinical tests, quite often generic pharmaceuti-
cal manufacturers wishing to conduct clinical trials that are completely similar 
to those already conducted by original manufacturers will not get the consent 
of the ethics committees involved due to the unnecessary testing on humans.29 
Moreover, quite often conducting new tests simply will not be economical.
24 Art. 10 (1) Directive 2001/83/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 November 
2001 on the Community code relating to medicinal products for human use (as amended by 
Directive 2004/27/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 31 March 2004); Art. 14 
(11) Regulation (EC) No 726/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 31 March 
2004 laying down Community procedures for the authorisation and supervision of medicinal 
products for human and veterinary use and establishing a European Medicines Agency. Meier, 
in: Meier/von Czettritz/Gabriel /Kaufmann, Pharmarecht, 2014, 176 seq., speaks about a 
reward for conducting [better: sponsoring] clinical trials and publishing the results. According 
to Fackelmann, in: Drexl/Lee, Pharmaceutical Innovation, competition and patent law, 2013, 
141, 178, especially at an early stage of the research and development process, when it is uncer-
tain whether a patentable invention will result, data exclusivity may act as an indirect incentive 
for innovation. The ECJ describes data exclusivity as an “exclusive right” and a “right to property 
relating to pharmacological, toxicological and clinical data”, ECJ, Case C-368/96, The Queen v 
The Licensing Authority established by the Medicines Act 1968 (acting by The Medicines Con-
trol Agency), ex parte Generics (UK) Ltd and Others, ECR I-7967 (1998), par. 79 et. seq., par. 
82 and 83.
25 The substance is further developed into a marketable product.
26 Cf. Fuller, Biologicals, Ch. 13, 403, 406 seqq., in: Shorthose (ed.), Guide to EU Pharmaceutical 
Regulatory Law, 3rd ed., 2012. Although biosimilars are not generics of the reference medicinal 
products whose bioequivalence can be demonstrated, they may also benefit from existing data 
after the expiry of data and market exclusivity due to art. 10 (4) Directive 2001/83/EC.
27 Art. 8 (1) Regulation (EC) No 141/2000 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 
December 1999.
28 The so-called Roche-Bolar exemption, Art. 10 (6) Directive 2001/83/EC of the European Par-
liament and of the Council of 6 November 2001 on the Community code relating to medicinal 
products for human use (as amended by Directive 2004/27/EC).
29 Cf. Art. 4 Regulation (EU) No 536/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 
April 2014 on clinical trials on medicinal products for human use, and repealing Directive 
2001/20/EC. The situation is different with biosimilars which are not identical with the refer-
ence product and lead to clinical tests not being the same.
D
el
iv
er
ed
 b
y 
In
ge
nt
a
? 
13
1.
15
2.
21
1.
59
 T
hu
, 0
1 
M
ar
 2
01
8 
16
:2
5:
14
C
op
yr
ig
ht
 M
oh
r S
ie
be
ck
Life Sciences and Intellectual Property: Technology Law Put to the Test 11
1.3 Regulatory Law as “another” IP
All in all, regulatory provisions are increasingly used as an incentive for “wanted” 
technologies. Although arguably public spending or tax exemptions might be a 
better, more transparent way to selectively push forward specific technologies, 
regulatory market exclusivity has become a tool of choice maybe due to its cost 
neutrality for the state. An impressive example from the US is the ultra-long 12 
years market exclusivity for an original biopharmaceutical30 and the extra exclu-
sivity for the first approved interchangeable biosimilar.31 From a patent law-
yer’s perspective, technology-specific regulatory law is indeed better suited as 
an incentive for downstream development costs (like clinical trials) than patent 
protection which is not only due to art. 27 (1) TRIPS but also due to the function 
of incentivising the unknown necessarily technology neutral. However, even this 
technology neutrality has come under attack recently.
. Patent Law as a Promoter for Specific Technologies?
Patent law shows some tendencies to leave its position as a technology neutral 
incentive for future innovations.32 The ordre public exception has been expanded 
especially in Europe being used as a tool against “unwanted” technologies. Like-
wise, the exception for essentially biological processes has been expanded. Some 
authors even propose to amend existing patent law in order to create an extra 
incentive for “useful” technologies like environmentally friendly technologies.
.1 Ordre Public Exception and Ethical Considerations
The current trend of charging patent law with ethical considerations was bol-
stered with the implementation of the Biotechnology Directive.33 The formerly 
slim ordre public exception (in the European Patent Convention art. 53 (a) EPC) 
which traditionally is interpreted narrowly and had only been serving as a “bail 
out” for extreme cases of unethical inventions, was amended by a whole list of 
life sciences inventions whose use is deemed to be unethical.34 Furthermore, 
with its Brüstle decision35 the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) 
expanded this exemption even more. The unpatentability of embryonic stem 
30 42 U. S. C. 262(k)(7)(A).
31 42 U. S. C. 262(k)(6).
32 For US patent law see Burk/Lemley, Is Patent Law Technology Specific?, Berkeley Tech. L. J. 17 
(2002), 1157, 1158: “As a practical matter, it appears, while patent law is technology-neutral in 
theory, it is technology-specific in application.”
33 It arguably started even earlier, e. g. with EPO’s Harvard Oncomouse decision, T 19/90 (OJ 
1990,476) – Transgenic Mouse/HARVARD.
34 Art. 6 (2) EC Directive 98/44.
35 ECJ, Case C-34/10, Oliver Brüstle v Greenpeace e.V.
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cells, a technology which is legal under regulatory law in many member states, 
turns the relation between patent law and regulatory law upside down. Besides, 
by taking into account how an invention was made the CJEU arguably did away 
with a fundamental principle in the interpretation of the ordre public exemption, 
stating that unethical or illegal behaviour in the process of creating an invention 
(the “stolen microscope”) does not influence the patentability of an invention. In 
effect, patent law has become the leading force in supressing stem cell technology 
as a politically unwanted technology. This may change when stem cell technol-
ogy leaves its current state as an emerging technology and yields first results in 
human medicine.
2.2 Exception for Essentially Biological Processes
Another boundary where ethical and technological neutrality of patent law cur-
rently is at stake is the exception for essentially biological processes (article 53 (b) 
EPC) concerning plant breeding methods. The EPO Enlarged Board of Appeal 
Broccoli II /Tomatoes II case is still underway.36 Although it seems consequent 
to apply the patentability exception to the products of smart breeding methods 
when the methods themselves are exempt (teleological interpretation certainly 
allows for an application beyond the scope of the mere wording), the wisdom of 
the Enlarged Board of Appeals’ first decision (Broccoli I /Tomatoes I)37 pulling 
smart breeding methods under the exemption may be doubted. If, in effect, after 
the pending second decision the majority of current developmental activities in 
cr p science are no longer protectable by patent law and plant variety protection 
alike, this would clearly be detrimental to innovative activity in the whole sector. 
However, maybe regulatory seed law might be a solution to this problem.
2.3 Privileging Specific Technologies?
Last but not least, patent law is not only used to discourage “unwanted” technolo-
gies but according to some proposals38 shall also be used to encourage specifically 
certain “wanted” technologies. The main argument against such amendments 
to patent law is the competence argument. Patent offices are competent to judge 
the novelty and the amount of creativity (inventiveness) of an invention. They 
are not suitable to judge a future usefulness (which market success will show) or 
ethical implications of the invention which have to be decided by political chan-
nels, especially legislation laying down regulatory rules, and subsequently by eth-
ics committees. Furthermore, technology neutrality is one of the cornerstones 
36 Referrals pending before the Enlarged Board of Appeal, Cases G 2/13 and 2/12.
37 Cases G 2/07 – Broccoli /PLANT BIOSCIENCE, G 1/08 – Tomatoes/STATE OF ISRAEL.
38 Derclaye, Intellectual Property Rights and Global Warming, Marquette Intellectual Property 
Law Review 12 (2008), 263, 286 seqq.
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of patent law. Both criteria, novelty and inventiveness, are open to any sector 
of technology including fundamentally new ones hitherto unknown. By foster-
ing the development of new technologies without categorising and judging it by 
economic, ecological, ethical or any other non-technological standard patent 
law increases the overall amount of new technologies. The further assessment of 
these technologies has to be carried out from an ex post perspective. Patent law 
necessarily takes an ex ante perspective.
VI. Conclusions
IP protection is one of the main pillars of technology law. In the area of life sci-
ences, IP law faces some challenges which are connected with the distribution of 
functions between IP law and regulatory law. Incentivising specific technology 
by granting market exclusivity under regulatory law faces some doubts but nev-
ertheless regulatory law is better suited to provide for such technology-specific 
rules than patent law. From an economic perspective, creating special incen-
tives for downstream developmental innovations can be considered a positive 
approach. Nevertheless, patent law should remain technology neutral and refrain 
from ethical or usefulness considerations as much as possible. Life sciences, 
being highly innovative, capital intensive and often charged with ethical impli-
ca ions, are not only driven by law, but also drive legal development. The role of 
IP law in the life sciences area remains a field of many interesting questions of 
legal research.
Zusammenfassung
Die Life Sciences und ihre industrielle Anwendung haben sich zu einem der führenden Tech-
nikbereiche entwickelt. Dieser Technikbereich weist eine hohe Innovationsrate und einen 
großen Investitionsbedarf auf, weshalb er auf geistiges Eigentum besonders angewiesen ist. 
Das Recht des geistigen Eigentums entfaltet dabei seine Regelungswirkung im Zusammen-
spiel mit anderen Rechtsgebieten, insbesondere mit dem regulatorischen Recht (Sicher-
heitsrecht) und dem Haftungsrecht. Im Life Sciences-Bereich ist es in besonderem Maße 
erforderlich, dass das Recht nicht nur Innovationsanreize setzt und Technologietransfer 
ermöglicht, sondern auch die Sicherheit bei der Technikanwendung gewährleistet und ver-
bleibende Risiken verteilt. Die traditionelle Aufgabenverteilung zwischen den einzelnen 
Rechtgebieten wird dabei jedoch zunehmend verwischt: Zulassungsrecht als klassisches 
Sicherheitsrecht dient auch der Schaffung von Anreizen für Entwicklungsaktivitäten wie kli-
nische Studien während das Patentrecht zunehmend auch dazu herangezogen wird, von 
unerwünschten Aktivitäten abzuschrecken.
Der Beitrag versucht zu zeigen, inwiefern geistiges Eigentum als Teil des Technikrechts 
begriffen werden kann und wie die Life Sciences einen derjenigen Technikbereiche dar-
stellen, der für das rechtliche Eingreifen in Technikentwicklung und -anwendung neue 
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Herausforderungen bereithält. Life Sciences werden dabei als Einsatz und Behandlung von 
Lebewesen verstanden, wobei der Begriff „Sciences“ entgegen dem ursprünglichen Wort-
sinn eher als Anwendung von Wissenschaft (Technologie) zu verstehen ist, der Einsatz von 
Lebewesen als Biotechnologie und die Behandlung von Lebewesen als Zusammenfassung 
von Medizin, Tiermedizin und Pflanzenschutz. Damit sind wirtschaftlich insbesondere die 
Bereiche Medizin, Pharma und Pflanzen umfasst. Technikrecht wird als techniksteuerndes 
Recht verstanden, das zugleich auf technische Innovationen reagieren muss. Es weist vier 
grundlegende Regelungszwecke auf: Innovationsförderung (geistiges Eigentum), Tech-
nologietransfer (Vertragsrecht), Risikominimierung (Sicherheitsrecht) und Risikoverteilung 
(Haftungsrecht). Eine besondere Forschungsaufgabe des Technikrechts ist es dabei, gerade 
die Querbezüge zwischen diesen einzelnen Bereichen zu untersuchen.
